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Protection, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster
Care System
SUSAN VIVIAN MANGOLD*
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
included an amendment to the Social Security Act allowing for-profit private
providers to subcontract with public child welfare agencies to provide foster care
services for abused and neglected children. Allowing profit making in the delivery
offoster care expands the privatization of service delivery in the child welfare
system. Nonprofitprivate providers have historically operatedfoster care systems
and in fact preceded public providers. The entrance ofprofit making into the system
raises issues ofaccountability and oversight unique to the profit making structure
of the corporations. These include concerns for size and location of the placements.
Professor Mangold asserts that the history ofprivate provider involvement in the
foster care system and an analysis of corporate structural differences suggest
reforms of the regulations governing public monitoring of all foster care
placements, especially of those regulating foster care providedfor profit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Abused and neglected children are today cared for through a system governed
bypublicfamily law. This area of family law is not the doctrinal field studied as
domestic relations involving the private family and the exchange of rights and
responsibilities between parents or related private parties.1 Instead, the system
combines both family law and administrative law by substituting a public agency
for a parent in the exercise of certain custodial rights. In public family law, the
private family is replaced with a combined state/family effort to raise the children
safely. There is no outside state; instead, the state becomes an integral part of the
family, temporarily holding some of the custodial rights to the child. The state is
required to exercise the parental role in the "least restrictive (most family
like) ... setting available in close proximity to the parents' home."' 2
* Associate Professor of Law, University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New
York The author wishes to thank Robert Berger, Lauren Breen, Tom Disare, Isabel Marcus, Peter
Pitegoff, and John Henry Schlegel for their suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this
Article. The author also wishes to thank the 1999 University at Buffalo Law School, State
University of New York Fellows in Family Law, Sheila Dickinson, Carolyn Goodwin, David
Kelly, and Daniel Morse, for their excellent research assistance.
1 See Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child Family Triangle in Public
Family Law, 47 BUFFALOL. REV. (forthcoming 1999). For a discussion of two types of family law
in California, one public and one private, see generally Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual
System ofFamily Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status (pts. I-m), 16 STAN. L. REV.
257 (1964); 16 STAN. L. REV. 900 (1964); 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965).
2 42 U.S.C. § 675(5XA) (1994 & Supp. 1111997); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(d)(3) (1998).
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Before the advent of the public family law system, abused and neglected
children were cared for through formal and informal arrangements by private
families and private philanthropic agencies dedicated to the care of such children.
Private provider agencies today work in a contractual relationship with public
agencies to care for abused and neglected children. Part of the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act3 (1996 amendment) amended the Social
Security Act to allowfor-profit private corporations to provide placement services
for these children. This change in the privatization of the state's custodial role in
public family law is the focus of this Article. The 1996 amendment was not passed
with additional provisions to insure that these new actors in public family law would
follow the preference for family-like, local placements for children.
The 1996 amendment allowed federal reimbursement for foster care provided
by for-profit companies. 4 Little attention was given to this amendment by the
Congress or child welfare community. This Article brings attention to this change
in the delivery of foster care services and begins to consider the implications of the
change.5
Initially, the author and the audience at the Implications of Welfare Reform for
Children Symposium were alarmed at the notion of profit making in the foster care
system.6 However, after considering the long-standing role ofnonprofits7 and their
3 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (Supp. II 1997).
4 See id.
5 Empirical analysis would contribute greatly to the study of for-profit and nonprofit foster
care. This Article is limited to a legal analysis of the new amendment based on consideration of
the goals of public family law, identification ofpossible conflicts, and suggestions for law reform
to mitigate harmful results. As part of the purpose of the Symposium and this Article is to heighten
awareness of the welfare legislation including the 1996 amendment, empirical study of the
problems of private for-profit foster care is encouraged.
6 Advoserv, the for-profit corporation behind the lobbying for the amendment, operates sites
in Delaware and Florida which house children from 24 states. It is a small privately held
corporation that places children with complicated histories and complex problems. See Nina
Bemstein, Deletion of One Word in Welfare Bill Opens Foster Care to Big Business, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 4, 1997, at Al. Public agencies have trouble placing these children and were willing, before
the 1996 amendment, to pay for the placements with local dollars since federal reimbursement was
not available. For-profit providers have also flourished in the industry of at-risk teens-youths at
risk of being involved with the child welfare system due to status offenses such as truancy,
incorrigibility, and ungovemability. In servicing at-risk teens, much of the finding that goes to the
privately held or publicly traded corporations is privately paid by parents and supplemented by
govemment finds. According to the Independent Educational Consultants Association, there has
been an approximately ten-fold increase in the number of teens served by such for-profit settings
in the past five years. In 1998, 10,000 at-risk youth were attending for-profit programs generating
$300 million in revenue. See Rebecca Kuzins, Second Chance at Success: Private Sector Is
Tackling Critical Needfor Intervention Programs, L.A. Bus. J., Mar. 22, 1999, at 6. Many for-
profit providers in the foster care business are large publicly traded corporations, which similarly
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partnership with public child welfare agencies, corporate structural differences do
not seem to be the keys to quality service delivery. The distinction between profit-
maling and nonprofit corporations is not necessarily a vital focus for regulation.
Instead, consideration of the 1996 amendment provides an opportunity to consider
the role of private providers generally, both nonprofit and for-profit, as well as the
unique attributes of for-profit corporations, which may heighten accountability
concerns. It is an opportunity to reexamine the oversight of placement providers
whether they be public, nonprofit, or for-profit.
Whether provided by the public agency directly, nonprofit agencies, or for-
profit corporations, foster care services must be closely monitored to protect against
abuse of children and misuse of funds. Until now, the many problems in foster care
settings have occurred mainly in nonprofit or public placements. Private providers
are allowed by law to provide a spectrum of placements, some larger and more
distant from a child's home than can be provided by public agencies. The 1996
amendment expands the pool of providers of private placements. I assert that the
size and location of the foster care site and the oversight mechanisms should be
regulated for all providers. That said, there are unique concerns raised and
heightened by for-profit companies in the foster care system, especially by large,
publicly owned corporations, and those are'also addressed in this Article.
The 1996 amendment allowing for-profit providers expands theprivatization
of the child welfare system by allowing profit-making corporations to provide
placement services for abused and neglected children. In this Article, the term
privatization means the general delegation of public functions to private actors. It
can involve delegation of policy making, regulation, and service delivery. Legal
scholarship in a variety of doctrinal and substantive areas is focused on the
increasing delegation of public functions to private actors.8 Here, the focus is
exclusively on the delegation of service delivery from a public child welfare agency
accept out-of-state children to aggregate care sites.
7 The nonprofits referred to here are often religiously affiliated. See generally Wilder v.
Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1341 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing the relationship between New York
City and the 60 private agencies that service over 90% of the children in foster care. This case is
part of decade-long litigation brought by the ACLUto challenge placement practices by religiously
affiliated foster care providers.). Policymakers often only parenthetically note the range of
nonprofits and their distinction from for-profit providers without full consideration of the
consequences of the distinction. See, e.g., Foster Care: Problems and Issues: Before the Subcomm.
on Select Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong. 120, 126-27 (1976) (statement of
Joseph B. Gavrin, Director, New York State Council of Voluntary Child Care Agencies)
[hereinafter Foster Care: Problems and Issues].
8 See generally JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF
PRIVATIZATiON AND EMPOWERMENT (1996); Lester M. Salamon, The Marketization of Welfare:
Changing Nonprofit and For-Profit Roles in the American Welfare State, 67 Soc. SERv. REv. 16
(1993).
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to a private foster care provider. Uniquely, foster care had originally been provided
by private agencies with public agencies later joining as partners. It was always a
"privatized" system, never an exclusively public one. While many of the same
issues of accountability and legitimacy which are prevalent in the literature are
relevant here, the focus on delegation of service implementation, not policy making
or regulation, narrows the focus of this inquiry.
Definitions of a few terms necessary for an understanding of this substantive
area are important. The term child welfare system is used to mean the entire
spectrum of services available for children including childcare, health, and nutrition.
While income maintenance programs are a form ofpublic welfare, child welfare
services do not usually include income maintenance programs. Child welfare
services include the dependency system, which is aimed at preventive and
rehabilitative services for abused and neglected children and their families. The
dependency system includes both in-home services available to children and their
families without transferring physical custody of the children to the state or local
child welfare agency and placement services. The foster care system is a part of the
dependency system. It is a spectrum of placement services available to abused and
neglected children. These placement services range from care provided by
individual families, which may or may not be related to the children, to group home
care and larger institutional settings. Public family law governs the care of all
children in foster care. Even when the child is at home but services by a public or
private agency are mandated by the court into a home against the parents' wishes,
such dispositions are governed by public family law.
This Article begins by describing the historical involvement of private
providers in the foster care system. Private nonprofit providers have long been part
of the provision of foster care for abused and neglected children and in fact pre-
dated the formation of public agencies. This Article considers the implications of
the amendment allowingfor-profit corporations to compete with nonprofit private
agencies to provide foster care services to abused and neglected children.
In Part II, the history of private providers in the foster care system is briefly
summarized. This history depicts a privately operated child welfare system that
preceded the entry of public agency participation. The care of vulnerable children
has never been an exclusively public enterprise. The evolving role of private
providers as contractors with public agencies is illustrated by the reliance of large
child welfare systems on nonprofit private providers. With the longstanding
privatization of the system, delegation of the parental role was eventually shared
between a public agency exercising case management and a nonprofit private
agency subcontracting to provide the custodianship.
Part III describes the evolution of public family law through the history of
public funding of foster care. The history begins with the White House Conference
on Children in 1909 and continues through the 1996 welfare reform and the
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Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.9 The role of the public state agency acting
to fulfill part of the parental role is described through the federal mandates imposed
on the states regulating the public child welfare agencies.
In Part IV, I analyze how the differences between for-profit and nonprofit
providers may impact the provision of services to vulnerable children. Foster care
is a special good or service that the for-profit company model does not produce in
sufficient quantity or deliver to all of those in need.10 Public entities and private
nonprofit foster care providers, which operate with a public service mission, have
evolved to produce such special services.11 While they have been criticized for the
operation of the foster care system, their only provision is providing services to
needy clients.12 Despite this purity of mission, as nonprofits increasingly tailor their
services to compete for public contracts, the services become decreasingly different
from those delivered by a for-profit company. 13
In addition, Part IV addresses the differences between public agency
relationships with private nonprofit foster care providers and for-profit providers.
The structural differences inherent in a profit-making enterprise, oversight location,
and size of the for-profit settings are considered in four parts and the implications
for the well being of foster children are addressed.
First, how may corporate structure impact the delivery of foster care? Are the
structural differences between nonprofits, which currently provide foster care, and
for-profits relevant to the delivery of foster care? One aspect of the difference in
9 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
10 Although often referred to as an entitlement program, foster care is really only a federal
entitlement for children who are eligible for public assistance at the time of placement. See 42
U.S.C. § 608(a) (repealed 1980) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997)).
11 See Eleanor D. Kinney, Legal and Ethical Issues in Mental Health Care Delivery: Does
Corporate Form Make a Difference?, 28 Hous. L. REV. 175, 180 (1991).
12 Seeid. at 180-81 Kinney states:
The distinguishing characteristic of the private, nonprofit corporation is that it cannot engage
in business for the purpose of making a profit and must use profits made to further the main
purpose of the corporation. Additionally, it cannot distribute profits to its members for
personal consumption and exists for public benefit, mutual benefit, or religious purposes.
Id. (citations omitted).
13 See Paul j. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEw INSnTtmONAJAsM
iN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYsIS 63 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). Is there
a problem with the overuse of public subcontracts with private providers generally or is there a
distinct problem with the entrance of for-profit private providers into the foster care field? See
generally I THE PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SERVICEs: POLICY AND PRACtiCE SSE, (Margaret
Gibleman & Harold W. Demone, eds., 1998).
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corporate form is profit distribution. Is the public and nonprofit operation of the
foster care system so inefficient that a profit can be made and services maintained
or improved? Nonprofits often engage in a variety of fundraising activities to
subsidize the public contracts they receive to provide services to needy children and
their families. These activities involve the larger local community in caring for
abused and neglected children and also enhance the services that can be provided
with limited and often inadequate public funds.
Second, while the public agency maintains the responsibility to provide
oversight for the child's placement in whatever setting it places the child, what
implications for oversight does the move to for-profit care entail? Oversight of for-
profit companies is different than oversight of public or nonprofit entities. Nursing
home care, mental health services, and juvenile justice and prison 14 systems
preceded child welfare in allowing federal reimbursement for services provided by
for-profit providers and the history of those systems raises cause for concern.
Third, does the provision of service by a nationally based as opposed to a
locally based provider make a difference to the children receiving the service? For-
profit companies that currently provide foster care services are nationally based,
unlike most locally based nonprofits that historically contracted to provide in-home
and out-of-home services. The history of private nonprofit provider involvement
and the importance of the connection to the local community will be discussed.15
14 See generally Children's Mental Health: Promising Responses to Neglected Problems,
HearingBeforethe Subcomm. on Children, Youth & Families, 100th Cong. (1987); Nu-sing Home
Abuses: Hearings Before the Subcom. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Interstate
& Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. (1977); ROBERT A. DORWART & SHERRm S. EPSTEIN,
PRIVATIZATION AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE (1993); PAUL L. GRIMALDI, MEDICAID
REIvMURSEMENT OFNURSING-HOME CARE (1982); RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (1997) (accepting existence of private prisons and arguing
accountability is the central concern); MARY ADELAIDE MENDELSON, TENDER LOVING GREED
(1974); FRANKE. Moss & VAL. HALAMANDAs, Too OLD, Too SICK, TOO BAD (1977); OFFICE
OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, CHILDREN'S MEN'ALHEALTH: PROBLEMS AND SERVICES,
No. OTA-BP-H-33 (1986); BRUCE C. VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE: THE NURSING HOME TRAGEDY
(1980); Burton A. Weisbrod & Mark Schlesinger, Public, Private, Nonprofit Ownership and the
Response to Asymmetric Information: The Case of Nursing Homes, in THE ECONOMICS OF
NONPROFrrINSTIrunONS 133 (Susan Rose-Ackennan ed., 1986); Palricia A. Butler, Assuring the
Quality of Care andLife in Nursing Homes: The Dilemma ofEnforcement, 57 N.C. L. REV. 1317
(1979); Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure ofAmerica's Prison Privatization Statutes,
21 SEroN HALLLEGIS. J. 371 (1997); William R. Shadish, Jr., Private-Sector Carefor Chronically
Mentally ll Individuals, 44 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 1142 (1989); Marc N. Sperber, Short-Sheeting
the Psychiatric Bed: State-Level Strategies to Curtail the Unnecessary Hospitalization of
Adolescents in For-Profit Mental Health Facilities, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 251 (1992).
15 See generally Linda Gordon, ChildAbuse, Gender and the Myth ofFamilyIndependence:
Thoughts on the History ofFamily Violence and Its Social Control 1880-1920,12 REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 523 (1983-1984). For a summary of earlier foundations for child protection created to
1300 [Vol. 60:1295
PROTECTION, PR1VATIZATION, AND PROFIT
Not only are the for-profit companies national in scope, they often provide
specialized out-of-home care at a location far from the child's home. The
implications of this separation from the community are explored.
Finally, will the entry of for-profit corporations as providers of foster care alter
the type of placement service provided? For-profit companies, in providing
specialized institutional care, receive reimbursement for aggregate settings larger
than can be legally provided by public entities which are limited to twenty-five bed
sites. 16 For-profit companies do not usually provide foster care, instead providing
an institutional alternative for often hard-to-place children. This niche market
involvement may change as for-profit companies are given greater access to public
dollars. It is also possible that use of out-of-state aggregate care for children labeled
"hard to place," will increase as states can now be reimbursed for the expenditures.
Before the 1996 amendment, some states found it fiscally sound to provide intensive
services into the child's home or to set up specialized local foster or small group
homes for children with severe disabilities or behavioral problems. With the advent
of federal funding to for-profit providers, shipping hard-to-place children to out-of-
state institutional sites may now become more fiscally tenable. Providing federal
reimbursement to a wider array of institutional settings will be discussed.
In the Conclusion, I offer some suggestions to mitigate the harmful implications
of the amendment in light of both the history of private provider involvement and
the current funding schemes described in Part II and Part III. The suggestions will
respond to the concerns raised in Part IV. My suggestions for reform focus
primarily on the attributes of private placements-size and distance from a child's
home-and not on problems uniquely posed by for-profit providers due to their for-
profit organization. Generally stated, my reforms are targeted at strengthening the
mandatory monitoring provisions dictated from the federal level so that oversight
will be more meaningful and uniform in all fifty states.
IH. THE HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT OF PRiVATE PROVIDERS IN THE FOSTER
CARE SYSTEM
Before the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there were no public or private
agencies dedicated to the care of abused and neglected children. It was private
deal with the issues of child labor and orphans in colonial times and through the civil war, see
generally Neil A. Cohen, Child Welfare History in the United States, in CHILD WELFARE: A MULTI
CULTURALFOCUS (Neil A. Cohen ed., 1992); Paul Gerard Anderson, The Origin, Emergence, and
Professional Recognition of Child Protection, 63 SOc. SERv. REv. 222 (1989). For a discussion
of the emergence of protection of children within the societies for protection of cruelty to animals
before the Mary Ellen case in 1874, see generally Lela B. Costin, Unraveling the Mary Ellen
Legend: Origins of the "Cruelty" Movement, 65 Soc. SERV. REV. 203 (1991).
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (Supp. HI 1997).
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philanthropic agencies that first began this work intervening into "private" families
in the name ofprotecting vulnerable children. The private agencies sometimes used
the criminal courts and received some public subsidy but there was no public
regulatory framework under which they operated for nearly a century.
The 1874 case of Mary Ellen was brought by Henry Bergh, founder and
President of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. 17
Bergh, through the Society's counsel, Elbridge Gerry, argued to the court on behalf
of Mary Ellen Wilson, a young girl whose care was at issue. 18 Although he was
acting as a "humane citizen" and not in his official capacity, the case heralds an era
of private philanthropic agencies acting on behalf of abused children. 19 The case
succinctly depicts the roles which "important others" could assume on behalf of
children-awareness of abusive activity in "private" families, investigation on
behalf of children, rescue, prosecution, and placement.
The New York Times article reporting this case opened:
It appears from proceedings had in Supreme Court yesterday, in the case of a
child named Mary Ellen, that Mr. Bergh does not confine the humane impulses of
his heart to smoothing the pathway of the brute creation toward the grave or
elsewhere, but that he embraces within the sphere of his kindly efforts the human
species also.20
The news article details that the child had been discovered when Etta Angell
Wheeler was on an "errand of mercy" to a dying woman and was told by the
woman of the desperate cries of a child in the next tenement.2 1 Wheeler had tried
repeatedly to gain entrance to the apartment to see the child; the child's caretakers,
Mary and Francis Connolly, denied access to her. Mrs. Wheeler was eventually let
into the flat when Mr. Connolly was not present and was able to observe and have
a short visit with Mary Connolly and Mary Ellen.22 Wheeler is then reported as
having gone to several institutions to seek help for the child, before coming to Bergh
and pleading for his assistance.2 3 It was known at the first hearing that Mary Ellen
17 See Costin, supra note 15; Mr. Bergh Enlarging His Sphere of Usefulness: Inhuman
Treatment of a Little Waif-Her Treatment-A Mystery to Be Cleared Up, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 10,
1874, at 8 [hereinafter Mr. Bergh].





23 See id. Perhaps because Mrs. Wheeler's husband was a newspaper man, the case is
graphically and fully reported in the paper. See Costin, supra note 15, at 210; see also, eg., Mary
Ellen Wilson: Further Testimony as to the Child's Ill Treatment by Her Guardians, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 12, 1874, at 12; Mary Ellen Wilson: Further Testimony in the Case-Two Indictments Found
[Vol. 60:12951302
PROTECTION, PRIVA TZATION, AND PROFIT
was living with Mary and Francis Connolly and they were charged with cruel abuse
against her, but that they were not her natural parents. The effect of this casual
custodianship on the willingness of the agency, court, and public to champion this
prosecution is unclear.24
On the second day of the court proceedings, Mrs. Connolly took the stand and
detailed how the child came to be in the custody of her and Francis Connolly.25
Mrs. Connolly testified that she was formerly married to Mr. Thomas McCormack
who was now deceased. They had three children together, all of whom were also
deceased. Mary Ellen was indentured to Mr. McCormack and his wife on the basis
that the child was his illegitimate daughter. Mrs. Connolly testified that the
Commissioner of Charities and Corrections who released the child to them never
inquired as to her relation to the child but had the name of Wilson down as the
child's natural mother.26 Mrs. Connolly is reported to have testified that she never
knew the whereabouts of the mother but from time to time would hear from her
husband's drinking buddies that she was still living downtown. Mrs. Connolly
further testified that she never received a cent to care for the child. She reported on
an annual basis to the Commissioner of Charities and Corrections on the condition
of the child, missing the annual reporting requirement only two times.27
The case was originally prosecuted against both Mr. and Mrs. Connolly. Mary
Ellen's ill health, lack of proper clothing and frequent abuse with whips, scissors,
Against Mrs. Connolly by the Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,1874; Mary Ellen Wilson: Mrs.
Connolly, the Guardian, Found Guilty, and Sentence to One Year's Imprisonment at Hard Labor,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,1874 [hereinafter Mrs. Connolly, the Guardian, Found Guilty]; Mr. Bergh,
supra note 17, at 8; The Mission ofHumanity: Continuation of the Proceedings Instituted by Mr.
Bergh on Behalfof the Child Mary Ellen Milson, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1874, at 2 [hereinafter The
Mission of Humanity]. For a compilation of related articles and papers of the Society, see 2
CHILDREN AND YourH n AmERiCA: A DocumENrARY HIsToRY, 1866-1932, at 185-97 (Robert
H. Bremner et al., eds., 1970).
2 4 This case did not impinge on the rights of Mary Ellen's father since he was deceased. Her
mother had abandoned or been separated from her much earlier so her rights are not at issue in the
prosecution. See Costin, supra note 15, at 209; Mr. Bergh supra note 17, at 8; The Mission of
Humanity, supra note 23, at 2. Mary Connolly, taking on the custodianship of Mary Ellen as her
stepmother, may have been prosecuted because of this legal relationship. It is also possible that she
was prosecuted, despite her ultimate willingness to allow Mrs. Wheeler into the flat against the
wishes of her husband, because she was the "mother" of the child and was therefore responsible
for the child's care under nineteenth century notions of parenting. Mr. Connolly's drunkenness,
violence against Mary Ellen, and possible violence against Mrs. Connolly are ignored perhaps
because he had no legal relationship to the child or perhaps because his behavior, as an unrelated
"man in the house," was not as shocking to the norms of child care at the time.
25 See The Mission ofHumanity, supra note 23, at 2; see also Costin, supra note 15, at 207-
08.
26 See The Mission ofHumanity, supra note 23, at 2.
2 7 See id
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and slaps must have been known ifnot perpetrated by both adults in the home. Even
if this cannot be proven, it was only Mrs. Connolly, on a day when Mr. Connolly
was not present, who allowed Mrs. Wheeler into the apartment to discuss Mary
Ellen's plight Only Mrs. Connolly ever appeared in court Only she was ultimately
tried and sentenced for the abuse.28 This celebrated case prosecuting abuse targeted
the "mother" caretaker. No male was held accountable. The case triumphs the entry
of private philanthropic agencies into the legal system on behalf of abused and
neglected children. The prosecution of Mrs. Connolly also foreshadows the
treatment of mothers and the failure to hold fathers accountable before dependency
courts.
2 9
The publicity surrounding this case led to important results for the future of
child protection. In the same year, a private provider agency, the New York Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, was formed with Elbridge Gerry as its
counsel.3 ° The activities of private provider agencies acting on behalf of abused and
neglected children increased significantly after this case. By 1880, thirty-three such
societies existed in the United States,3 1 most rescuing both animals and children. As
Henry Bergh of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
explained:
The protection of children and the protection of animals are combined because the
principle involved, i.e., their helplessness, is the same; because all life is the same,
differing only in degree of development and expression; and because each profits
by association with the other.32
These earliest efforts were aimed at rescuing children and, sometimes,
prosecuting the adults who brutalized them. The societies did not see within their
mission the housing or care of children or treatment of the families. As Gerry
explained:
2 8 See Mrs. Connolly, the Guardian, Found Guilty, supra note 23, at 8.
29 See Marie Ashe, Postmodernism, LegalEthics, andRepresentation of "Bad Mothers, "in
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORYAND THELEGALREGULATON OF MOTHERHOOD 142 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); see generally Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn,
ChildAbuse: A Problemfor Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75 (1993); V. Pualani Enos,
Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws'Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused
Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229 (1996); NATIONAL Cr. ON WOMEN & FAMILY LAW,
FAILURE TO PROTEC: A REFERENCE MANUAL FOR NEW YORK ATTORNEYS REPRESEiING
BATrERED WOMEN AT RISK OF LOSING THEIR PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR FAILURE TO PROTECr THEIR
CHILDREN FROM THE ABUSER (1993).
30 See Costin, supra note 15, at 205,217.
31 See Gordon, supra note 15.
32 Costin, supra note 15, at 2.
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The SPCC 'was simply created as a hand affixed to the ann of the law, by which
the body politic reaches out and enforces the law. The arm of the law seizes the
child when it is in an atmosphere of impurity, or in the care of those who are not fit
to be entrusted with it, wrenches the child out of these surroundings, brings it to the
court, and submits it to the decision of the court-unless, on the other hand, it
reaches out that arm of the law to the cruelest seizes him within its grasp, brings
him also to the criminal court and insures his prosecution and punishment These
are the functions of our societies.' 33
Gerry's speech was intended, in part, to distinguish the rescue mission of
anticruelty societies from the placement services provided by children's aid
societies. Contemporary with the emergence of aid and anticruelty societies were
state laws requiring the removal of children from poorhouses.34 While it was
considered a progressive reform to move innocent children from the conditions of
the poorhouses, it often meant separating them from their parents. Such laws
furthered the notion that destitute children could be "helped" like orphans and like
children voluntarily turned over to the societies by their parents who could not care
for them.
The expansion of the railroad in the mid-nineteenth century provided the routes
necessary to accomplish the goal of moving children out of the squalid environment
of their families. Charles Loring Brace, founder of the New York Children's Aid
Society, best expressed this goal. He believed that children of the poor could be
productive citizens only if removed from their parents' negative influence and
surroundings. The mission of the Children's Aid Society was moving children from
their parental homes to "wholesome" settings, both near and far. From the founding
33 Costin, supra note 15, at 219 & n.71 (citing Elbridge Gerry, Remarks at the Thirty First
Annual Meeting ofthe American HunaneAssociation 51 (Oct. 12-14, 1907)). In this 1907 speech
at the Annual Meeting of the Society, Gerry was also clear that the Society's purpose was to rescue
children and refer their parents for prosecution, not to provide treatment The NYSPCC was 'ot
created for the purpose of educating or reforming children, or seeing that they were transported
into other homes" Id. at 219. This description was meant in part to differentiate the purposes of
the Society from the work of the New York Children's Aid Society which gathered up children
from the industrializing Northeast cities and sent them on "orphan trains" to the rural Midwest
where they were given "proper homes" through an informal indenture. These rescue efforts are
also distinguishable from tum-of-the-century child protection efforts. Carl Carstens led the first
of these agencies, the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (MSPCC).
In 1907, at that Society's Annual Meeting, Carstens stated the broader mission of child protection:
'Children will still need to be rescued from degrading surroundings for many years to
come .... but the society recognizes more definitely that it is a preventive agency."' Paul Gerard
Anderson, The Origin, Emergence, and Professional Recognition of Child Protection, 63 SOC.
SERV. REV. 222,224 (1989) (citing ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MSPCC 27, at 17 (1907)).
34 See Act of Apr. 24, 1875, ch. 173, 10 N.Y. Stat. 74; see also, SEMI CENTENNI4L
CELEBRATION: THEBUFFALO ORPHAN ASYLUM46 (Apr. 26, 1887).
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of the Society in the 1850s, some of the children placed out were from institutional
settings and others were voluntarily turned over to the Society by their parents.
Many were not legally orphans, but their destitute status qualified them for the
placement services of the Society. The Children's Aid Society is perhaps best
known for the "orphan trains," trainloads of East Coast urban children sent to the
Midwest to work farms and otherwise settle new areas. Placing out sometimes
involved the sending of individual children to identified couples seeking to increase
the size of their families. It also included urban-based settings such as the lodging
houses for newsboys. 35
Provider agencies grew in the model of both the rescue and prosecution mission
of the anticruelty societies and the placing-out mission of the aid societies. Within
a regime of private family law, private societies substituted their care for parental
care. Public family law, with the states legally assuming certain parental rights, did
not develop until the 1960s when states began to mandate the reporting of child
abuse and took on the task of investigating the reports. Public funding of the
placements, often paid to private providers who historically provided the service,
also developed in the 1960s.36
1H. THE DEVELOPMENT OFPUBLIC FAMILY LAW: PUBLIC FUNDING OF
OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN
In 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt convened the White House Conference
on Dependent Children.37 Among the proposals emanating from the conference was
a call to provide funds to allow needy children to stay with their mothers instead of
placing them in institutional settings. 38 States introduced mothers' pensions in 1911
and all but two states had some form of mothers' pensions by 1935.3 9 Aid to
Dependent Children, later Aid to Families with Dependant Children, was initiated
in 1935 in part to allow poor children to remain with their families rather than be
35 For a full description of Children's Aid Society, see generally MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, THE
ORPHAN TRAINS: PLACING Our IN AMERICA (1992).
36 See The Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248 § 212, 81 Stat.
821, 897-98; (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); HR. CoNF. REP. No. 90-
1030 (1967) reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3179, 3206; S. REP. No. 90-744 (1967) reprinted
in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2834, 3132.
37 See generally MATrHEw A. CRENsON, BUILDING THE INVISIBLE ORPHANAGE: A
PREHISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE SYSTEM (1998).
38 For a general discussion of the importance of this conference in the evolution from
orphanages to home based care for needy children, see id
3 9 See JoAnne B. Ross, Fifiy Years ofService to Children and Their Families, 48 Soc. SEC.
BULL., Oct. 1985, at5, 6.
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sent to orphanages.40 However, some states refused to aid children whose homes
were deemed "unfit."41
Discrimination, mainly by southern states, in denying welfare benefits based on
subjective assessments of fitness led to the "Flemming Ruling," named for the then
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Arthur Flemming.42 The rule required
states to either continue payments to the children while attempting to improve the
child's home conditions or place the child in out-of-home care.43 In 1961,
amendments to the Social Security Act codified reimbursement for state and local
foster care expenditures through Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Foster
Care (AFDC-FC).44
AFDC-FC was added to provide funding for temporary out-of-home placement
for children who were removed from their homes based on allegations of abuse or
neglect. A purpose of AFDC-FC was to keep poor children out of orphanages by
providing home-like settings through foster care placements when they could not
safely remain in their own homes. A judicial determination that remaining in the
home was contrary to the welfare of the child was necessary to trigger eligibility for
AFDC-FC.45 Only children whose families were eligible for AFDC before the child
was removed were eligible for AFDC-FC funding.4 6 Although it is frequently stated
that abuse and neglect can occur in all income levels, federal reimbursement for out-
of-home care through AFDC-FC was only available for poor children. As had been
40 See id.
4 1 FRANcIS Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. COWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCrIONS
OF PUBLIC WELFARE 138-41(1971).
42 See id.; Mark E. Courtney, The Foster Care Crisis and Welfare Reform: How Might
Reform Efforts Affect the Foster Care System, 53 PUB. WELFARE, Spring 1995, at 27; Marcia
Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980s: Child Welfare Impact Litigation After the Warren Years, 20
FAM. L.Q. 255,256 (1986).
4 3 See id
44 42 U.S.C. § 608 (repealed 1980) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 672 (1994 & Supp. I
1997)).
45 See id § 608(aX1) (repealed 1980). This provision "reflected Congress' awareness" that
removals needed to be ordered following formal proceedings. This was hoped to protect against
unnecessary removals due to suitability rules imposing "various moral and social standards" on
parents of dependent children. Miller v. Youakin, 440 U.S. 125, 139 (1979).
46 See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (repealed 1980) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (1994 &
Supp. 1111997); see also Courtney, supra note 42, at 27. AFDC was mandated for needy children,
but because state eligibility limits were set so low, nearly one-third of the children living below the
poverty level in 1992 did not qualify for cash assistance. Approximately 15% of the children
receiving AFDC in that year were in foster care. See Stephen B. Page & Mary B. Lamer,
Introduction to the AFDCProgram, FTumRE CHMDREN, Spring 1997, at 20,21 (citing U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENrATIVES, COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103RD CONG., 1994 GREEN BOOK, at 324,409
tbl.10-31 (Comm. Print 1994).
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true a century earlier, destitute children were more likely to be moved to alternative
settings.
The amendment, which codified the Flemming Ruling, was the subject of little
debate. There were no formal public hearings by the Senate Finance Committee
before its enactmient 47 During the short debate, Senator Lausche expressed concern
over issues raised in a letter to him from Reverend Monsignor Lawrence J.
Corcoran, Diocesan Director of Charities in Columbus, Ohio.48 Lausche's
opposition was limited to the fact that public hearings had not been held at which
interested parties, especially private providers, could speak.49 The importance of
private providers, especially religiously based agencies, was repeatedly mentioned
during this short exchange in the Senate. 50
During this time, definitions of 'mfit" were amorphous and allowed the
separation of many poor children from their families. In the 1960s, led by the
medical profession, new information on physical abuse of children 51 prompted
enactment of state reporting laws. Objective verification of physical abuse led to the
further development of public family law. All states codified reporting laws in the
1960s. These laws required some professionals who work with children to report
any suspicion of child abuse.52 Nascent regulatory regimes were established to then
require the investigation of the reports and the care and protection of the children
who were the subject of the reports.
These early state attempts were followed by the first federal law dealing with
abuse and neglect, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA)
enacted in 1974.53 State child protective services systems were Uniformly upgraded
to meet the federal requirements to receive reports of abuse and neglect, investigate
those reports and keep records on perpetrators and victims of abuse.54 In order to
be eligible for federal funds to operate their child protective services system, the
states had to meet the requirements of CAPTA. The fifty separate state systems
operated under the same federal guidelines imposing some uniformity while
providing incentives and disincentives via various forms of federal
47 See 107 CONG. REC. S6385, S6385-88 (1961).
48 See id. at S6385-86.
49 See id. at S6386-88.
50 See id.
51 See generally Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962).
52 See BARBARA J. NELsON, MAKING AN IsSUE OF CHILD ABUSE: POLIICAL AGENDA
SETrnNG FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS 13 (1984); see generally JEAN YAVIS, CONGRESSIONALRESEARCH
SERV., CHILDABUSELEGISLATnON INTHEUNrIED STATES (1974), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC.
S23900, S23901 exhibit 1 (1973).
53 Pub. L. No. 93-247, tit. I, §§ 101-05, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (partially repealed 1996 and
partially amended 1975, 1978, 1979, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1996).
54 See id.
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reimbursement. 55 The expansion of information about child abuse and neglect and
increased reporting to the child protective systems flooded the foster care system.
From 1961 to 1977, there was a three-fold increase in the number of children in out-
of-home care, rising to nearly 500,000 in 1977.56
Concurrently, in the 1960s, the Social Security Act was amended to allow states
to subcontract with private nonprofit companies to provide foster care services.57
Many of these private nonprofit companies had been in existence long before the
public entities played a role in the protection of abused and neglected children.
Because there had long been a private philanthropic system of care, it is inaccurate
to say the public system was "privatized," as the term usually implies the transfer
of traditionally public functions to private contractors. Instead, public family law
allowed philanthropic providers to receive public funds and work cooperatively
with public agencies to provide placement services.
The states could now work in a contractual relationship with private agencies
to provide a child protection and foster care system. Instead of a fledgling public
system and an autonomous, disjointed philanthropic effort, subcontracting
formalized the foster care system into an administratively regulated public family
law regime. In the 1970s, child welfare agencies were given the mandate by federal
and state law to respond to cases of child abuse and neglect with the provision of
services ranging from investigation to placement of children at risk of further
harm.58 Some or all of these functions could be delegated by the public agency to
private nonprofit providers and still be reimbursed with federal dollars.
In 1980, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Aet59 was passed to renew
efforts to keep poor children in their homes. The Act provided federal funding for
in-home services and a mandate that reasonable efforts be made to prevent
placement or to reunify children with their families when temporary placement
became necessary.60 Private nonprofit companies contracted with public agencies
to provide not only the traditional foster care services, but also these newly
mandated in-home services. The law also provided subsidies to remove
55 See id.
56 See 125 CONG. REC. 110, S22679, S22681 (statement Sen. Alan Cranston) (citing 123
CONG. REC. 24861 (1977)) (testimony of Assistant Secretary for Human Development Services,
Arabella Martinez who provided a number of facts derived from the National Study of Social
services for Children and Their Families).
57 See sources cited supra note 36.
58 See Pub. L. No. 93-247, tit. I, §§ 101-05, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (partially repealed 1996 and
partially amended 1975, 1978, 1979, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1996).
59 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
amended by Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
6 0 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 670, 671(aX15) (1980) (amended 1997).
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disincentives to the adoption of foster children by allowing adoptive families to
receive contiriued funding up to the level the child could have received as a foster
child.61
As with mothers' pensions originally, the emphasis was on correcting misuse
of the foster care system by keeping poor children at home whenever it was
reasonably possible and to move them to adoptive homes and out of placement
when reunification was not possible. Despite this goal, funding for in-home services
was capped and funding for foster care and adoption assistance remained uncapped
entitlement programs. 62 Today, federal funds for out-of-home care are the "last
unlimited pool available for poor children."63
Entitlement to welfare was ended with the limiting provisions of the 1996
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act64 leaving foster
care payments as the final uncapped funding resource. The 1996 act originally
included massive reform of the foster care and child protection system.65 Early
versions of the legislation ended the entitlement to foster care and changed the child
protection and foster care funding systems to a block grant program. The original
House welfare reform proposal, passed in March 1995, replaced existing entitlement
and other child welfare services with the Child Protection Block Grant.66 This
proposal became less sweeping in the House-Senate conference version of H.R. 4,
which was vetoed by President Clinton.67
While most of the changes to the foster care system were eventually dropped
from the legislation in its final form,68 one change from the original House version
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 Nina Bernstein, Deletion of One Word in Welfare Bill Opens Foster Care to Big Business,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4,1997, at Al; see also New York Times News Service, For-Profit Orphanages
Eligible for Federal Funds: Change in Law Raises Questions About Care and Who Should
Provide It, BALTIMORE SUN, May 4, 1997, at I IA.
64 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
6 5 See KAREN SPAR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CHILD ABUSE AND CHILD WELFARE
LEGISLATION iN THE 104TH CONGRESS 6 (1996).
6 6 COMM,=E ON WAYS & MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES, 104TH CONG.,
SUMMARY OF WELFARE REFORM MADE BYPuBLIC LAW 104-193, THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBlLnY
AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION AcT AND ASSOCIATED LEGISLATION 40 (Comm. Print
1996) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF WELFARE REFORM]. H.R. 4, the original House welfare reform
proposal, replaced Titles IV-B and 1V-E of the Social Security Act, CAPTA and other child
welfare provisions. See SPAR, supra note 65, at 6.
67 See SPAR, supra note 65, at 6.
6 8 Discretionary and capped child welfare services under Title IV-B of the Social Security
Act continue to be authorized. Uncapped entitlements for foster care and adoption assistance are
likewise maintained. No amendments to CAPTA were passed as part of the welfare reform
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did pass as part of the welfare reform legislative package. That change amended the
Social Security Act by deleting the word "nonprofit" and allowing for-profit private
providers to receive federal reimbursement for foster care funding.69 The change
makes over three billion dollars in federal foster care funding available to for-profit
companies.70 While some states were already contracting with for-profit providers,
use of these placements was limited since states could not receive federal
reimbursement for the expenditures.
Senator John Breaux stated that the change would give states more options.71
Some believe that this change in funding will result in a large "business of poverty"
which will capitalize on the unlimited federal funding available in the "orphans for
profit" industry.72 I argue that the possible consequences for children in for-profit
foster care warrant more regulatory protection than was provided when the
amendment was added to the welfare reform package without debate. The reliance
on private providers generally warrants closer public scrutiny. The concerns are
greatest for children in large institutional settings distant from their families. Such
placements are privately operated because federal law limits the size of public
placements. Currently, larger, more distant settings are likely to be offered by for-
profit providers who were constrained until the 1996 amendment from developing
a less restrictive range of placements.
Federal funding of these provisions should not be allowed without concurrent
regulations insuring that the overarching goal of placement in the most family-like
setting near to the child's home is achieved and verified. In fact, in 1980 when the
child welfare system was overhauled by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act, for-profit companies were not made eligible for the federal ftrds.73 There was
concern that the nursing home scandals of the previous decade would be repeated.74
The House Committee on Ways and Means Report on the 1996 legislative change
legislation. See SUMMARY OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 56, at 40.
6 9 See id. at 40; see also 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (Supp. 11 1997).
70 See Bruce Alpert, Profit-Makers Enter Foster-Care Field: Some Worry That Move Will
Leave Children at the Mercy of Companies'Bottom Line, SEATTLE TIMES, May 16, 1997, at A8
[hereinafter Alpert, Profit-Makers]; Bruce AlperI Advocates Fear Outcome ofFor-Profit Foster
Care, Critics Say Youths'Needs Will Suffer Bottom Line, NEW ORLEANS TIMEs-PICAYUNE, May
11, 1997, at A6 [hereinafter Alpert, Advocates Fear Outcome]; Bernstein, supra note 6, at Al.
7 1 See Alpert, Profit-Makers, supra note 70, at A8; Alpert, Advocates Fear Outcome, supra
note 70, at A6.
72 The New York Times News Service, Change Unhinges Poverty Policy Welfare-Funding
Scramble Fierce, DENV. POST, May 31, 1997, at A19. The article cites literature from some ofthe
companies which highlights the "emerging market in 'vulnerable, high cost populations."' Id.
73 See 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (1982) (amended 1996) (defining "child care institution" to include
only non-profit private child care institutions and public institutions ofnot more than 25 beds).
74 See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 26; The New York Times News Service, supra note 72, at
A19; see generally Foster Care: Problems and Issues, supra note 7.
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notes: "States remain responsible for establishing and enforcing licensing standards
and for ensuring that children are in safe and reliable care.'75 While there has
always been concern that there is a shortage of quality foster care, expanding foster
care expenditures to profit-making entities is not necessarily the best way to insure
that out-of-home placement is used only when necessary and is then the highest
quality of care.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 199776 amended many of the
provisions passed in 1980 to encourage reunification.77 The law makes federal
reimbursement contingent upon following a new set of mandates to quicken the
pace of cases heading toward termination of parental rights78 and removing the
mandate for reasonable efforts to reunify families under certain circumstances. 79
Weakening the reasonable efforts requirement may temporarily move more children
into foster care and the emphasis on permanency through adoption will require
extensive home finding and adoption support services. These changes are taking
place as for-profit corporations are entering the child welfare reimbursement system
following the 1996 amendment. Together, they may signal a sea-change in policy
away from the goal of placing children in settings close and similar to their families
to help reunification efforts. If such a change is occurring, more attention should
have been paid to the 1996 amendment and its implications.
Understanding of these federal mandates is important to an understanding of the
public family law regime because they govern the implementation of the
dependency system on the local level. They determine the role of the public agency
in holding parental rights and the subcontracting of that role to private providers.
These federal mandates are all codified as amendments to the Social Security Act
They regulate the state implementation of a dependency system by conditioning
federal reimbursement for local expenses on the fulfillment of the mandates.80
There is no federal child welfare system, but the federal mandates frame the
provision of services in each of the fifty states and their various local child welfare
systems. The 1996 federal amendment allowing for-profit providers to contract with
public child welfare agencies has an impact on the delivery of foster care services
75 SUtMMARY OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 68, at 40; see also SPAR, supra note 65, at
5; Bernstein, supra note 6, at 26 (quoting Brian Murphy, Vice President for Advoserv, a for-profit
company which lobbied for the amendment, "[m]y whole bottom line argument is if the state
decides to send a child to a facility, if they like the track record and the cost, what does the form
of ownership have to do with it?").
76 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2116 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
7 7 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (Supp. 1I 1997).
78 See id. § 675 (Supp. DI 1997).
7 9 See id. § 671.
80 See id.
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at the local level because federal reimbursement is a key factor in the provision of
services for all dependency systems.
Today, private provider agencies participate by delivering services to families
voluntarily and by court order. Unless they are involved in an ongoing way with a
family when new allegations arise, they do not usually participate in the front end
or "rescue" aspect of cases. It is the public agency that receives reports and
investigates as the anticruelty societies did for nearly a century before the formation
of public child protection agencies. Today, public child protection agencies also
maintain records on perpetrators and children.
In the modem public/private system, private agencies usually enter at the point
of disposition and deliver the services that are agreed upon by the public agency and
family or mandated by the court. In larger cities, the public agency may subcontract
with over two hundred different private agencies to provide foster care, counseling,
a variety of family supervisory functions, and a host of other services targeted to
improve parenting and protect children.81 The work of private nonprofit provider
agencies predated the establishment of state-based child protection systems and
dependency systems. With the breadth of federal and state mandates, the complexity
of each individual case and the growing volume of cases, the modem dependency
system relies on them more than ever to fulfill some of the states' roles in exercising
custodial rights to children.
81 States either directly operate dependency systems or funnel state/federal reimbursement
to state regulated county-based systems. It is difficult to discern the number of subcontracting
private agencies from the central state agencies. In New York State, there are approximately 225
private foster care agencies. Telephone Interview with Paul Gadre, New York State Office of
Children and Family Services (May 8, 1998). In Pennsylvania, there are 209 approved agencies
providing foster family care services which contract with the 67 county agencies in the state. Letter
from Robert L. Gioffre, Director, Adoption and Residential Service Unit, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, Office of Children, Youth and Families, to Susan
Vivian Mangold, Associate Professor, University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New
York (Nov. 4, 1998) (on file with author). In Massachusetts, there are 86 separate private agencies.
Telephone Interview with Susan Bane, Massachusetts Department of Social Services (May 7,
1998).
Florida estimates that there are 70 licensed child-placing agencies that offer foster, group, and
shelter placements. Including those which offer only adoption services, there are 104 licensed
child-placing agencies in Florida. Letter from Amy West, Program Specialist, Florida Department
of Children and Families to Susan Vivian Mangold, Associate Professor, University at Buffalo
Law School, State University of New York (Dec. 14, 1998) (on file with author). In some states,
private providers have come together to negotiate joint or collaborative contracts with the public
agency. See generally, Francis J. Ryan, A Consorfium to Coordinate Public and Voluntary Sectors
Under Contract in Child Welfare, 59 CHILD WELFARE 607 (1980). The norm remains individual
contracts with each private agency.
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IV. THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC FAMILY LAW:
SUBCONTRACTING WITH FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS
A. Corporate Structure
As discussed in Part II, nonprofit private providers preceded public agencies in
the delivery of placement services to abused and neglected children. Nonprofit
agencies are now major players in every state, fulfilling some if not all of the direct
service delivery of the child welfare system as summarized in Part IMI. What are the
implications for the delivery of foster care services when for-profit entities enter the
reimbursement system? Should we be concerned about the wholesale privatization
of foster care in general or focus on the specific concerns raised by for-profit
corporations? In my view, the main problem is that private providers are regulated
differently than public providers under both state and federal child welfare
regulations. They are allowed to be bigger and farther from a child's home as will
be discussed later in this Part For-profits also pose unique accountability problems
that require even further regulation to insure adequate monitoring. The structural
differences giving rise to these accountability concerns are raised here. The
accountability is addressed in the next section.
To understand the possible impact of for-profit private providers, it is important
to summarize the distinctive nature of nonprofit corporations and thereby identify
the differences from the for-profit structure. The study of nonprofits is fairly new
to the law, with Henry Hansmann's seminal work being published in 1980.82
Nonprofits are studied as operating in a "third sector" distinct from both government
on the one hand and profit-making corporations on the other hand. They are defined
by a "nondistribution constraint" meaning they cannot distribute their profits, if
any, to shareholders holding stock in the enterprise.8 3 They can operate with a net
gain at the end of the year, but this must be reinvested in the mission of the
nonprofit instead of being distributed to shareholders.84
In a nonprofit no one owns the corporation. Directors' actions in a for-profit
corporation, on the other hand, are accountable to owners or shareholders who elect
them. Directors' primary purpose is to advance the wealth of shareholders. Directors
in nonprofits are less clearly accountable to those who appoint them since they are
82 See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835
(1980).
83 See id. at 838. But see Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principles: The Economic
Convergence ofthe Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457
(1996). Brody accepts Hansmann's construct but challenges whether the nondistribution restraint
results in more "worthy" entities. Id
84 See Hansmann, supra note 82, at 838.
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not usually served by the corporation and may not oversee the other directors.85 The
role of the attorney general, discussed in the next section, is therefore important to
provide formal accountability mechanisms.
The nondistribution constraint is integral to the existence of nonprofits since
there are not traditional market forces in the third sector.86 Those who fund
nonprofits are often separate from those who will receive the service and the lack
of profit may provide some assurance that funds will not be misused or services
inadequately delivered. Some argue that altruism also defines true nonprofits and
is a vital element of the third sector.87
Hansmann developed a scheme to understand the various types of nonprofits,
defining some as more like, and others less like for-profit entities which respond to
market forces.88 Under his descriptions, nonprofits can be "mutual," meaning they
are controlled by the patrons or "entrepreneurial," meaning they are controlled by
those providing the service.89 Under this analysis, nonprofit providers in the foster
care system are entrepreneurial nonprofits.
The next level of distinction is made based on how the nonprofit is funded. If
it is supported by contributions it is a "donative" nonprofit If it is instead supported
by funds generated by the service they provide it is a "commercial" nonprofit.90
Nonprofit providers in the foster care system are mainly commercial since their
funding is via government contracts. These funds may be augmented by donations
making them commercial/donative nonprofits.
Fundraising activities to subsidize the services provided by nonprofit entities
may not be continued by for-profit providers. This is an important departure of for-
85 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., ABA GUIDEBOOK FOR
DiRECrORs OFNONPROFrr CORPORATIONs 12-13 (George W. Overton ed., 1993).
8 6 The case of Gary W. highlights some of the seemingly illogical market activity in the child
welfare nonprofit sector and when the public agency contracts with out-of-state for-profit
corporations. Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976) ("Yet, despite the
shortage of facilities in Louisiana, the economic theory that supply will respond to demand is being
ignored and, in some sort of antiparochialism, LHHRA is paying Texas institutions far more than
it is paying Louisiana institutions. The private suppliers of every kind of Louisiana residential
program are being paid less than the cost of the program they supply, and less than is being paid
to Texas profit-making institutions."). Id at 1221.
87 See generally Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C.L. REV. 501
(1990). For a critical view ofnonprofits against a background of general acceptance of the positive
influence of altruistic motives, see generally Regina E. Herzlinger & William S. Krasher, Who
Profitsfrom Nonprofits?, 65 HARV. Bus. REV. 93 (1987).
88 See Hansmann, supra note 82, at 841; Eleanor D. Kinney, Legal and Ethical Issues in
Mental Health Care Delivery: Does Corporate Form Make a Difference, 28 Hous. L. REv. 175,
181-82 (1991).




profit providers who do not have a donative aspect but are strictly commercial
enterprises. Philanthropic giving may be sought by both kinds of private providers
but grassroots fundraising such as bake sales, auctions, and walk-a-thons are
unlikely to be hosted by for-profit corporations for their own benefit. These are
important events for the donations they solicit but also because they get members
of the community at least marginally involved in the foster care system. Those
making a contribution, participating in a walk-a-thon, or otherwise engaging in
fundraising activities develop some stakeholder status in the work of the nonprofit
As donors take an interest in the work of the nonprofit some community oversight
of the foster care system is provided. Instead of supplementing funding with such
donations, for-profit providers will exact a profit from the foster care
reimbursement.
Adopting Hansmann's categories,91 the nonprofits providing foster care are
entrepreneurial commercial/donative nonprofits. Entrepreneurial commercial
nonprofits are most like for-profit providers. This suggests that we should be
concemed about these types of nonprofits as well as their for-profit counterparts.
The donative aspect of the nonprofits in the foster care system mitigates this to some
extent and illuminates the profit-making aspect of for-profits.
The donative aspects are some evidence that the public reimbursement alone
is insufficient to cover the costs of delivering the services provided by the nonprofit
This suggests that the contracted reimbursement may not cover the expenses of
providing foster care and that the fundraising supplements may be necessary
revenue to meet foster care expenditures. If that is the case, how will for-profit
providers extract a profit?92 On the other hand, involving donors from the
community in some form of fundraising may not be the most efficient or effective
way to insure community participation and oversight Fundraising may consume an
inordinate amount of time and energy of a nonprofit board and its staff. Like the for-
profit, fiscal survival may become the key concern and detract from the operational
work of the agency. This is especially true when the donor segment of the
community is distinct from the recipients of the service, as is usually the case with
foster care. Adequate reimbursement and quality oversight by the public agency or
by community boards could be applied to both for-profits and nonprofits to better
91 See Hansmann, supra note 82.
92 See I.R.C. § 131 (1994) (exempting foster care payments from income tax consideration).
The reason is that the payments are not income but rather funds to cover the cost of boarding the
child. The payments considered under this provision of the tax code are the portion of foster care
payments that go directly to the custodial individual or couple, not the portion of the payment that
goes to the administration of the public or private agency with which the custodian subcontracts
to provide the service. Perhaps some savings could come in the administration of the agency and
this could be skimmed off as profit, but the competition for contracts would presumably eliminate
much of the inefficiency in administration in an effort to offer the lowest bid.
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insure quality of program. Fundraising could be maintained to the extent it
strengthens the acceptance of nonprofits in the community and augments their
programs.
Another possible implication is the impact of competition by for-profit
companies on the other work performed by nonprofits in the community. In addition
to or instead of supplementing the revenue available to provide foster care, the
public contracts and fundraising activities may subsidize other work by the
nonprofit, which is not publicly reimbursed. Will grassroots community work
outside the foster care field be impacted by the loss of foster care contracts from
nonprofit to for-profit competitors? This community work is often preventive in
nature and may have an effect on who goes into foster care and how long they stay.
Opening the same pool of public funds for foster care to both for-profit and
nonprofit providers obfuscates the third sector analysis and raises two questions.
First, if entrepreneurial commercial nonprofits and for-profits are competing for
federal monies to deliver services to needy children, can we trust that those services
will be delivered properly? Second, should we be more concerned about for-profit
participation in this scheme than we are by the extensive privatization of child
welfare services in general by entrepreneurial commercial/donative nonprofits?
Focusing here on corporate structure and in the next section on oversight, the
answer is that we should be concerned about the delivery of services to vulnerable
populations by the government, nonprofit or for-profit entities. The insular nature
of the relationship between the funding source and the service provider, with the
recipient so far from the contracting scheme, raises the possibility of misuse of
funds and poor services. This is a concern whether the provider operates under a for-
profit or nonprofit organization.
While this is true, introduction of the profit motive and distribution raises the
level of concern because it adds a further risk factor to the relationship between the
finding source and the service provider with the recipient still removed from the
exchange of authority and funds. As was discussed in Part I, the historical and
longstanding mission of nonprofits to help destitute children gives some sense of
reliance upon their service delivery. While altruism and mission may be idealistic
and overplayed, it still plays a role in the delivery of human services, especially to
children. It is unsavory to read shareholder information which speaks of
"investment in vulnerable populations" and rates of return based on the use of
public monies intended to provide room and board payments for abused and
neglected children.93 This language reflects one underlying distinction between for-
93 See Magellan Health Services Annual Second Quarterly Announces Second Quarter
Fiscal Year 1999 Results in Line with Expectations: Adjusted Earnings Per Share Up 40% Over
Prior Year, Business Wire, May 5,1999, available in WESTLAW, All News Plus Wires database,
ALLNEWSPLUS [hereinafter Magellan Health Services]; see also American Private Enterprises,
Youth Services International, Inc., available in Hoover's Company Profile Database on CD-ROM
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profits and nonprofits, namely, the focus on profits.
While all private providers must be closely monitored, the risk of misuse of
funds and poor service delivery is increased when shareholders evaluate their
investment at least in part based on return and not necessarily on quality. On the
nonprofit side, misuse may be a concern when there is no competition for service
delivery and management and service are of low quality but unchallenged. One
answer to such concerns is stricter oversight of all private providers discussed
below.
B. Oversight
The concern over accountability of private actors performing public functions
is a ripe debate in administrative law and in other substantive law areas.94 The
concern is sometimes diminished when the private actor is engaging in service
delivery, as is the case here, and not policy making or regulation. When the service
delivery is to a population as vulnerable as abused and neglected children in foster
care, accountability and oversight are crucially important.
Some of the for-profit corporations providing foster care are small, closely held
companies with a few actively involved owners. Others are large, publicly traded
corporations. Many of the same oversight concerns arise for both kinds of for-
profits-as profit is one, if not the only, consideration. Large, publicly traded
corporations are sensitive to shareholder pressure for return on an investment Board
choices may be motivated by profit maximization even at the expense of quality. In
contrast, a local proprietary provider may more closely resemble a local nonprofit
so the concerns raised in this section would be less relevant to such a provider.
Concerns for profit heightens the need for public oversight for quality of
service. Both nonprofits and for-profits are accountable to their customers and to
their staff.95 The separation of the "customer," or foster care client, from the
exchange of funds is the same for nonprofits and for-profits. For-profits are also
accountable to owners or shareholders, at least in terms of the "bottom line." As
opposed to market assumptions for most goods and services, a strong bottom line
does not necessarily translate to quality services.
While donors and volunteers are interested in a "good investment," they are
donating to the nonprofit so that it will be able to offer quality services. There is no
(Gary Hoover ed., 1998) ("An increase in juvenile crime means more business for Youth Services
International (YS. he... company has left the unprofitable behavior health business (essentially
treatment facilities for troubled youth) for the greener field ofjuvenilejustice.").
94 See generally Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a
Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649 (1987); Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the
Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 911 (1988).
95 See generally, Brody, supra note 83.
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monetary gain to the donor, aside from tax benefits. Instead, any oversight provided
is to insure that the community is receiving the services offered by the nonprofit
Public oversight is important for all private providers but especially for-profits
whose stakeholders may otherwise focus on profit, instead of--or even at the
expense of-quality. The only public accountability legally held over for-profit
corporations is via the public agency that sends the foster children to the private
placement Regulations for oversight and the contract provisions between the public
agency and the placement provider are the two vehicles to insure accountability.
Both must be strengthened for all providers, especially for placements for children
sent a distance from their homes to aggregate settings where community and family
oversight is less present.
The additional levels of public oversight extended to nonprofits may also offer
protections not in place over for-profits. State attorneys general formally provide
oversight over nonprofits. The directors of nonprofits would otherwise be free of
such control. Especially for religious nonprofits, this oversight may be negligible,
but it is a formal legal arrangement that can be exercised. 96 States attorneys general
can impose monitoring, reporting, and investigating authority over nonprofits to
protect against waste or diversion of funds.
Nonprofits are also regulated and monitored for compliance by the Internal
Revenue Service ORS) as part of the review of their designation for nonprofit
status. 97 At least theoretically, the IRS has an ongoing role in overseeing the
nonprofit's activities to insure it is not violating the terms of this nonprofit
designation.
If public accountability by the IRS and attorneys general has any teeth, it adds
to the oversight provided by the public child welfare agency. It is formally in place
to oversee the work of directors who are otherwise unaccountable to the class of
beneficiaries (here, foster children and their families) served by the work of the
nonprofit. The directors must account and answer to the attorneys general. Even
religiously affiliated nonprofits that enjoy First Amendment protections are subject
to attorneys general's monitoring to protect against misuse of charitable funds. The
risk of misuse of funds may therefore be heightened by the wholesale entry of for-
profit providers into the foster care system since they are not subject to this
additional public oversight.
96 Volunteers and donors may also contribute some oversight to the work of nonprofits.
Directors may be concerned about the donor or volunteer's perceptions of the nonprofit enterprise
since these financial or in-kind donations are vital to the nonprofit's operations. Neither of these
constituents is in a contractual relationship with the directors. They cannot legally control the
functioning of the nonprofit although withdrawal of their support may offer some functional
control.
9 7 See I.R.C. § 6033(b) (Supp. 1999) (requiring section 501(cX3) nonprofit organizations to
file detailed annual information returns); see also I.R.C. § 501(c) (Supp. 1999).
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For-profits are not susceptible to this public accountability which at least exists
as part of the regulatory scheme and to a greater or lesser extent in practice.98
Oversight is provided externally only by shareholders and the public agency. This
suggests that accountability by the public agency must be increased to properly
supervise the for-profits and maintain the integrity of public family law. This is also
vital for the nonprofit providers if the IRS and attorneys general are negligent in
their monitoring.
C. Nationally Based For-Profits
Concerns for oversight are heightened by the fact that the for-profit
corporations currently providing foster care services are likely to be nationally, not
locally, based.99 Not only are their corporate headquarters out-of-state from the
states with whom they contract but the placement facilities are as well. This raises
two distinct problems: first, lack of a corporate nexus in the community of services
increases concerns for accountability; second, children are more likely to be placed
at a setting far from their home.
A for-profit's corporate headquarters might be in Georgia but the corporation
could operate foster care homes all over the country. With no historic or current ties
to the community where the homes are provided, corporate boards are less reliable
in providing oversight or exercising judgment based on local or individual needs as
opposed to corporate profits. Distance from the community of service amplifies
concerns already present from the privatization of child welfare services. Not only
are the recipients distant from the contractual exchange of public funds for service
delivery, but the parent corporation of a subsidiary corporate provider may be far
removed from the community of service with no board or philanthropic ties to that
98 See David Shichor & Clemens Bartollas, Private and Public Juvenile Placements: Is There
a Difference? 36 CRvIE & DELINQ. 286,297 (1990) (suggesting that scrutiny by the public of
private facilities is lacking).
99 Some of the same providers, such as Magellan Health Services, Inc. and Correctional
Services, Inc., which recently took over Youth Services International, are operating in a variety of
systems. See generally MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., INC., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1998);
CORRECTIONAL SEavs. CORP., INc., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1999). Magellan is one of the
country's largest managers of mental health care. One of its business units, National Mentor,
provides foster care. A division, Magellan Public Health Solutions, contracts with Hamilton
County, encompassing Cincinnati, to manage the entire child welfare system. See Richard Curtis,
Children's Health Services Manager Criticized- Magellan "Overambitious'" in Setting First-
Year Goals, CINCINNATI Bus. COURIER, Dec. 18, 1998, at 1. It is the state's managed health care
company in Montana where it determines whether therapeutic foster homes will be allowed to
continue to provide services to the children placed in them. See Mental Health Providers Brace
for Changes, BILLNGs GAZErE, Apr. 15, 1999, at C1. Recent figures indicate that company
profits are up 40%. See Magellan Health Services, supra note 93.
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locality.100 While nationally based corporations may have collective expertise, the
exercise of such expertise can only be assured through oversight.
The second concern regarding distance of placement from the child's home
may be more an historic relic than a future problem. Because federal funds were not
available to reimburse the states for the placements provided by for-profit providers
before the 1996 amendment, the placements they provided were mainly for hard-to-
place children. These children needed very specialized settings, such as a placement
for autistic children in the dependency system. Any single state or local child
welfare agency might have one or a few children needing such a placement In some
instances, it was cost effective to ship them out-of-state for the service, even if paid
for exclusively with state and local dollars, when it would be more expensive to
create the placement locally with a nonprofit agency for so few children.
Public policy has long recognized that family reunification is less likely when
children are placed at a distance from their family and community. 10 1 The
preference for a homelike setting in close proximity to a child's home is codified at
42 U.S.C. § 675 (5)(A), which requires states to review their cases to insure that
they meet the federal mandates. That section reads in part:
The term "case review system" means a procedure for assuring that-
(A) each child has a case plan designed to achieve placement in a safe setting that
is the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available and
in close proximity to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special
needs of the child .... 102
As all states receive federal reimbursement for their foster care systems, all are
required to follow the federal mandates. The mandate regarding family-like setting
and proximity preferences is codified by the states.103 The law goes on to require
100 Some have raised the contention that for-profit directors are actually more accountable
than their nonprofit counterparts. See generally Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of
Nonprofit Directors and Offlcers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L.
631 (1998). This argument is based largely on the lack ofgovemment enforcement of duty of care
and duty of loyalty standards over nonprofit boards. While this may be accurate when comparing
national nonprofits such as the United Way to nationally based for-profits, the local community
nexus of most nonprofit foster care providers adds a degree of oversight and accountability not
present ith nationally based for-profit corporations.
101 See H.1R REP. No. 136, at 48-49 (1979).
102 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A) (1997 Supp III).
103 See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODEr. 660-5-28-.06(l)(bXl), (2) (1998); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE
tit.7, § 51.200 (b) (1996); IDAHO CODE § 16.06.01.424 (01)(c), (d) and 16.06.01.050 (04) (1998);
IND. ADMIN. CODE tit.470, r. 3-9-3 (1996); MD. REGs. CODE tit.7, § 02.11.03(B)(6), (17),
§ 02.11.11(C) (1999); MASS. REGS. CODE tit.7, § 101(1) (1998); MINN. R. 9560.0545 (1)(C)
(1997); NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit.10, § 1331-3.4(a)(5) (1996); N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit.18,
§ 430.11(d)(1) (1999); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit.10, r. 410.0204(b)(1) (Oct. 1999); OHIo ADMIN.
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that the public agency sending the child or the public agency where a distant
placement is located must visit the child no less frequently than every twelve
months.10 4 Such arm's length oversight provides fewer professional eyes and ears
monitoring the quality of the service. This is a problem of oversight for all private
agencies but is exacerbated with for-profit placements of which distant locations are
a defining feature.
Now that for-profits are eligible for federal reimbursement they may move
beyond the niche market to less intensive foster care placements. With federal funds
available to them as they are to nonprofits, they can compete for the entire spectrum
of out-of-home care and not just regionally or nationally based facilities. This may
lead to for-profit facilities and placements that are local with corporate headquarters
far from the nexus of service delivery. The quality concerns raised by distance of
headquarters and facilities should be addressed for all private providers even if the
impact would be more concentrated on for-profit providers.
The federal government as a requirement for reimbursement should require
all private providers to have local boards drawn from the community of service.
This would create local oversight for all placement providers akin to the type
assumed in a donative nonprofit. Second, to address concerns over distant
placements, the court in a dispositional review hearing held no later than one month
after placement should approve all out-of-locality placements. Dispositional reviews
conducted as administrative formalities months after placement are not sufficient
to protect the interests of foster children. Instead, full reviews with the safety and
CODE § 5101:2-47-02(E) (1999); 55 PA. CODE § 3130.67(b)(7)(i), (ii) (Apr. 1999); S.D. ADMIN.
R. 67:42:09:17(1) (1997); 40 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1333(c)(4) (West 1998).
104 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A)(ii) requires:
The term "case review system" means a procedure for assuring that--(A) each child has
a case plan designed to achieve placement in a safe setting that is the least restrictive (most
family like) and most appropriate setting available and in close proximity to the parents'
home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child, which-... (ii) if the
child has been placed-foster care outside the State in which the home of the parents of the
child is located, requires that, periodically, but not less frequently than every 12 months, a
caseworker on the staff ofthe State agency of the State in which the home of the parents of
the child is located, or of the State in which the child has been placed, visit such child in such
home or institution and submit a report on such a visit to the State agency of the State in
which the home of the parents of the child is located.
42 U.S.C. § 675(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. 1111997). States codify this provision requiring annual
visits. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16.06.01.424(01)(o) (1998); ILL. ADMN. CODE tit89, § 315.110(e)
(1998) (requiring Illinois social workers to visit children in institutional settings monthly unless
the setting is 50 miles or more away, then the visit must occur at least bimonthly); ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit.89, § 315.130(d)(10) (1998) (requiring Illinois social workers to visit children placed out-
of-state annually); IND. ADMIN. CODE tit470, r. 3-9-3 (1998); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit.18 § 430.1 l(c)(2)(ix) (1999).
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welfare of the child and the least restrictive, "most family like setting" standards
applied would help insure that distant placements are not misused. For out-of-
locality placements, reviews should be held monthly, not every six months as is
required by federal law.105 This will serve as an accountability mechanism to insure
the necessity of the distant placement and an administrative burden to discourage
the misuse of such placements. Such distant placements should also be visited with
on-site contact with the child, no less frequently than once per month. Annual visits
as currently required by federal law are frighteningly inadequate to provide
meaningful oversight. A report on the monthly site visit, need for visitation, and
other relevant concerns should be mandatorily considered on the record of monthly
dispositional reviews.
D. Size ofFacilities
Private agencies are allowed to operate large facilities to care for foster
children. Federal law prohibits public agencies from operating placement settings
with more than twenty-five beds. 106 Before 1980, private facilities could operate at
any size, but public facilities could not be large-scale institutions. The 1980
provision was added to allow public facilities to increase in size to twenty-five beds
in the hopes that more community based group homes would be developed.10 7 The
105 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) reads:
The status of each child is reviewed periodically but no less frequently than once every
six months by either a court or by administrative review... in order to determine the safety
of the child, the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement, the extent of
compliance with the case plan, and the extent of progress which has been made toward
alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care, and to project a
likely date by which the child may be returned to and safely maintained in the home or placed
for adoption or legal guardianship ....
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (Supp. Im 1997).
In 42 U.S.C. § 675(6), administrative review is defined as:
[A] review open to the participation of the parents of the child, conducted by a panel of
appropriate persons at least one of whom is not responsible for the case management of, or
the delivery of services to, either the child or the parents who are the subject of the review.
42 U.S.C. § 675(6) (1994). States codify this requirement for six-month reviews. See, e.g., ALA.
ADMIN. CODE r. 660-5-28-.06(2) (1998); IDAHo CODE § 16.06.01.050(09) (1998); IND. ADMIN.
CODE tit.470, r. 3-9-3 (1996); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 30-4-80(o.
106 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (Supp. i1 1997). For a discussion of this provision, see S. REP. No.
96-336, at 15-16 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA..N. 1448, 1465.
107 See Hearing on HR. 7200 Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance of the Comm. on
Finance, 95th Cong. 249, (1977) [hereinafter Hearing on HR. 7200]. The congressional intent is
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private providers operating the large institutions were allowed to remain at
unlimited size because they were seen as "specialized care facilities for handicapped
children. 1 08 Allowing reimbursement for public facilities of no more than twenty-
five beds was to encourage the development of smaller facilities than were offered
by private nonprofit providers in every community. The hope was to move children
to smaller settings and to keep them local.
Private providers are still allowed to contract for placements in larger settings,
although the federal mandates dictate that the placement should be in as "family
like" a setting as possible.10 9 Despite the ninety years since the White House
Conference on Children recommending mothers' pensions to keep children out of
orphanages, aggregate care settings still exist.110 Will expansion of the private
provider network, especially to for-profits, which have been providing large
regionally based facilities, increase the likelihood of institutionalization of
dependent children?
Any federal allowance which increases aggregate care at the expense of in-
home or foster family home care should be closely monitored to insure that children
are in the least restrictive, most family-like setting possible as is mandated by
clear in the legislative history of the Act:
At the present time Federal funding of foster care maintenance payments for children
is available for children placed in foster care homes and also for children placed in a nonprofit
private child care institution. The committee bill would broaden the provision to allow for
Federal funding of foster care maintenance payments for children in public as well as private
facilities, but only if the public institution serves no more than 25 resident children. While the
committee recognizes that this change in the law does somewhat expand the foster care
authority of the law contrary to the committee's overall goals of de-emphasizing foster care,
the committee believes that such a change is important in order to encourage States to
develop less intensive forms of institutional foster care. In other words, it is the intent of the
committee that this authority be used by the States to make it possible to move children from
large, highly institutional private institutions into smaller institutions which more nearly
approximate the atmosphere of a home .... Because the intent of this provision is to
encourage the development and utilization of group home care, the committee expects that
the administration will closely monitor claims for reimbursement under this authority to
assure that payments are not made with respect to care in large institutions which have made
superficial changes, such as the establishment of a 'group home' wing within a larger
institution. The committee intends that only institutions which are clearly and definitely
separate entities serving 25 or fewer children will be covered by this provision.
S. REP. No. 96-336, at 15-16 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1465.
10 8 See Hearing on H.R. 7200, supra note 107, at 249.
109 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
110 In Building the Invisible Orphanage, Matthew A. Crenson argues that the lesson to be
leamed from the historical experience of orphanages is 'just how little control we exercise over
the institutions we create, and how difficult it is to escape them." CRENSON, supra note 37, at 331.
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federal law.111 Again, risk of more large-sized facilities may be greater with the
reimbursement of for-profit providers in the foster care system, but the risk should
be regulated for all private providers.
As with the concerns for distant placements, the federal provisions which
codified the 1996 amendment 12 should be amended to require that the court in a
dispositional review hearing approve all placements in settings exceeding twenty-
five beds. The review should be held no later than one month after placement with
no allowance for retroactive funding. Administrative reviews held months after
placement are inappropriate to protect children in foster care. Ongoing reviews
should be held monthly to insure that the rights of all parties-parent, child, state,
and other recognized parties-as well as the responsibilities of all subcontracting
providers with the state are properly protected and exercised.
V. CONCLUSION
Concerns and suggestions are raised here in the hope that attention will be
generated on monitoring the foster care system generally and specifically the
implementation of the 1996 amendment allowing for-profit providers to receive
federal funds for foster care. Such attention is an interesting possible consequence
of the amendment: the entrance of for-profit providers may bring new eyes to the
foster care system which has long wallowed in a perhaps beneficent but often
neglectful public/nonprofit sphere. Attention by additional members of the
community may be the most important result of this amendment if it informally
increases oversight.113
Oversight is crucial. Competition for public contracts to provide foster care may
lead to cheaper services by a wider array of providers. The key is to insure that
quality is not sacrificed. When the 1980 amendments were codified as part of the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Congress explicitly cautioned states
to take care in developing group home facilities, to insure that placements were not
"wings" of existing large facilities but were in fact new, community based group
homes. Any such concerns were not elaborated by the 1996 Congress which was
focused on the complicated issues of welfare overhaul and not on the implications
of for-profit foster care.
The federal government, as a condition of reimbursement, should amend the
11 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A).
112 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.).
113 While this is a hope, private for-profit management of child welfare services generally
has not heralded a new dawn of better services for abused and neglected children. Instead,
problems have arisen with Medicaid billing, confidentiality breaches, referrals, and a host of other
areas. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 99, at 1.
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reimbursement law and regulations to protect against possible abuses by all
providers. First, local boards should be created in the community of services.
Second, courts should approve institutional or distant placements within one month
of placement, not as part of semi-annual administrative case reviews. They should
be reevaluated for appropriateness and quality in monthly court dispositional
reviews. Finally, the public agency where the placement is located should visit each
out-of-locality child at least monthly to help insure the quality of care. These
monthly visits should be considered at the dispositional reviews.
In sum, extracting a profit from foster care dollars may be unseemly, but if the
children benefit from more quality placements, it is money well spent The risk that
profit may come at the expense of quality must be monitored by the public agency.
The for-profit model raises unique issues in the foster care area because of the lack
of public oversight by the attorney general and IRS as is at least formally afforded
to nonprofits. Only the public child welfare agency is in a position to monitor the
foster care services provided. This oversight must be clear and is best not only
codified in regulations but also enumerated in the funding contract provisions.
The nature of the foster care service and the distant and aggregate structures of
the placements provided by for-profits raise the greatest concern for vulnerable
children. Such placements, if not absolutely necessary, may only serve to frustrate
reunification with the child's family. They also pose oversight issues for the public
agency sending the child to a distant location. Regulations to attend to these
concerns will remedy the lack of consideration when the amendment allowing
federal reimbursement to for-profit providers was made part of the 1996 welfare
reform package.
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